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Faculty and Deans

THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
HARVEY FRANK*

Public corporations today are more than businesses. They are miniature governmentsl which even more than in the past influence the
social, political and economic fabric of American life.2 And their influence goes beyond the nation's borders to intrude into the foreign
policy of the United States.3 In other words, the problem of the status
of corporations goes beyond the familiar but still unresolved question
of the separation of managerial control from the economic interest of
shareholders. 4 A fundamental question is raised about the place of
public corporations in the American political and economic superstructure. A public corporation must operate within the law but otherwise need be responsive to no one, neither to the government, to the
public at large, nor normally in practice to its own shareholders. It
is a private government in a public sphere whose citizens have only
the shadow of a vote.S
May a corporation with a large concentration of wealth and economic
*Currently a Professor of Law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia; formerly a partner, specializing in
corporate Jaw, with the New York City law firm of Schwartz, Burns, Lesser and
Jacoby; LL.M. in tax law, New York University Law School; J.D., Harvard
Law School; A.B., New York University.
lTwo examples will illustrate the scope of these pseudo governments. In 1973,
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. had consolidated sales and revenues
of $23.5 billion and 1,023,000 employees, MooJ>v's PUBLIC UTILITY MANUAL 991
(1974), and Gen. Motors Corp. had consolidated sales and revenues of $35.8 billion
and 810,000 employees, 1 MooJ>Y's INJ>USTRIAL MANUAL 1066 (1974). By contrast,
the 1973 gross national product of a sampling of several moderate sized European
nations was: Finland, $16.5 billion; Greece, $16.4 billion; Norway, $18 billion;
Portugal, $10 billion; and Switzerland, $42 billion. The 1970 gross national product
of the continent of Africa was $59.7 billion, while tile combined 1973 sales and
revenues of GM and A.T.&T. was $59.3 billion. U.S. BuREAu OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT oF TH~ UNITltJ> STATES 824, 825 (95th ed. 1974).
2This is axiomatic. A few notorious illustrations outside the econolnic sphere
include the problems of employment discrimination by race and sex, the environmental impact from industrial pollution to strip mining, the direct and indirect
political contributions by corporations to campaigns and the molding of consumer
taste. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S. Ct. 814, 12 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring opinion and appendix 1 thereto).
3A few current illustrations would be the alleged interference of International
Telephone and Telegraph Co. with elections in Chile, the actions of oil
companies in the Middle East, mutual landing .rights of United States and foreign
airlines, and arms shipments and the sale (or r~usal to sell) sophisticated technological information to the Soviet Union. Historical examples would include the
founding of Jamestown by the Virginia Company, and the colonization of parts of
Asia by the East India Company.
4See T. VEBLEN, ABSE~ OwNERSHIP 215, 216 (1923); and A. BltRLE & G.
MEANS, THE MoJ>ERN CoRPORATION ANJ> PruvAn PROPERTY 7 (rev.· ed. 1967).
SSee Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 404 U.S. 403, 92 S. Ct. 577,
30 L. Ed. Zd 560 (1972) (Douglas J., dissenting opinion).
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power and concomitant social and political power properly exist in a
democracy without being subject to political control through a democratic
political process, and if it does so, can that democracy long endure?
Certainly there are grave risks although some commentators are less
alarmed than others.6 However, the major problem has not been one
of principle but one of practice. Corporations do present the form of
democracy, but not the substance, thus camouflaging the underlying
reality. This article, after examining the scope of the present situation,
shall make a modest proposal to modify the form in order to effectuate
substantive corporate democracy.

I.

CoRPORATE DEMOCRACY-THE MYTH AND THE REALITY

First, let us explore the extent of corporate democracy in America,
both the myth and the reality. The examination shall be limited to
corporate democracy in shareholder elections but shall exclude referendum elections such as approval of mergers, sale of assets and the like.
Not that such matters are unimportant, but they raise a different and
less fundamental set of problems and are worthy of separate treatment.
The election of directors by a vote of the shareholders is a natural
out-growth of the concept of a business corporation and is the required
procedure in every state. This philosophy was accepted by Congress7
in enacting the proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,8 and some aspects of corporate elections are stricter than political
elections.9 Yet, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(herein the "Commission") dealt mainly with procedure, to insure an
honest election and a reasonably informed electorate. The substantive
rights adhering to a shareholder's franchise were described by the law
of the several states.
Public corporations appear to represent an economic extension of
American political democracy. More than thirty million Americans
owned shares in public companies in 1970 with an aggregate estimated
market value of 682 billon dollars, and a substantial number of additional
Americans had an indirect interest in publicly held stock estimated at
365 billion dollars, held by intermediate fiduciary institutions such as
pension trust funds, mutual funds and life insurance companies. 10
6See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971) ; Chayes, The
Modern Corporation and ~he Rule of Law, in THE CoRPORATION IN MoDERN SociETY
25, 40 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
7H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13-14 (1934).
8Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
9SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956).
IONEw YoRK SrocK ExcHANGE, CENsus OF SHAREOWNERSHIP 1, 24 (1970).
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The forms of corporate democracy are familiar. 11 Each year in
advance of the annual meeting of shareholders, an annual report on
slick paper containing pictures and looking for all the world like an
expensive magazine is mailed to shareholders, as well as a simple black
and white proxy statement printed on plain lightweight bond paper.t2 A
few corporations include pictures of nominees in the proxy staten1ent.
More include pictures of existing directors in the annual report where
they can be better balanced by pictorial endorsements of the company's
product. A proxy form and a postage paid return envelope are
enclosed so that a shareholder who does not attend the meeting may
vote for the nominees of the existing management, and while his vote
will have no influence on the result, it may be useful in establishing
a quorum. At the meeting, if he attends, he will hopefully receive an
optimistic report by the company president. If he is fortunate he may
even hear some penetrating questions by fellow shareholders which may
or may not be answered from the podium. Many companies put out
post-meeting reports which summarize the discussions and questions
at the meeting for those who do not attend. A new trend is to have
an informal information meeting before or after the shareholders meeting with the two-fold purpose of allowing more time for officers' reports
and shareholders' questions and minimizing stockholder participation
at the formal meeting. Bond-holders and holders of debentures, even
convertible debentures, cannot vote and may not even be entitled to
notice of the meeting. They have an economic interest in the corporation, but only the shareholder can vote. Only the shareholder is a
citizen of the corporation.t3 All this has the appearance of democracy
except that voting is on a per share not a per capita basis. There
appears to be majority rule, but is there? The question requires a brief
look at corporate democracy in action.
llThey elaborate on a pattern prescribed by SEC Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240
(1974) and state law. The discussion in this article is limited to corporations which
by reason of § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U!S.C. § 78 (1970)
have common stock subject to the proxy rule. Although proxy solicitation is not
required by either state or federal law (though once undertaken it must comply
with the appropriate requirements referenced in the preceding sentence) , the New
York Stock Exchange Listing Agreement § III 1f 5 and the American Stock Exchange Listing Agreement § 6b require corporations with stock listed on such
exchanges to solicit proxies for all meetings of shareholders. See also NEW YoRK
SrocK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL A-29, A-34 and AMERICAN SrocK ExCHANGE CoMPANY Gumt 299, 300 (1973).
12SEC Proxy Rule 14a-3(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974) requires the company to
supply additional copies of the annual report and proxy statement to brokerage
houses and others who hold stocks of record for beneficial owners and pay the
reasonable cost to distribute copies of this material to the beneficial owners.
13A few state statutes now authorize corporations to grant voting rights in their
charters to holders of debt securities, e.g., 8 Da. CoDE§ 221 (1953) and CAL. CoRP.
CoDE § 306 (1947). Such debt instruments are quite rare in public corporations.
Their existence would expand the concept of a corporate citizen,
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How is a shareholder's election for directors conducted? Some weeks
before the annual meeting of shareholders a slate of nominees is selected
by the existing board of directors.I 4 To almost no one's surprise, nearly
all of the nominees are existing directors. 1 S They may be officers of
the company, corporate counsel, bankers or investment bankers to the
company, substantial stockholders, and may also include several unaffiliated persons presumably friendly to management.16
Many boards consist of directors who, even in the aggregate, own
a very small portion of the outstanding stock of the company and that
often acquired by stock options. In fact, generally speaking, the larger the
corporation, the smaller the direct stock ownership that is represented on
the board. For example, in 1975, the nominees for director of American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. and their families owned in the
aggregate 21,856 shares of common stock of 560,940,041 shares outstanding,17 or 0.0039 percent of the outstanding shares. Other examples
selected at random show that nominees for director owned in the
aggregate the following percentages of outstanding common stock:
0.051 percent in Exxon Corp., 0.094 percent in U.S. Steel, and
0.302 percent in Caterpillar Tractor.ts The list could go on. Moreover,
a large number of the shares held by officer-directors were apparently
purchased through key employee stock option plans or similar plans
pursuant to which shares were purchased at an advantageous price.
This is not a new phenomenon and continues the trend predicted by
Professor Berle a generation ago.l9
These directors have no constituency, yet they serve unchallenged
on their boards year after year, in good times and in bad. 20 There
is no way to compel a shareholder's nominee to be included in the
14See M. MACE, DIREcToRs: MYTH AND REALITY 195 (1971).

lSFor example, a random sampling of twenty public corporations shows that only
fourteen directors of an aggregate of 304 directors failed to be re-elected. If
directors who were not renominated for reasons of death or retirement (as stated
in the company's annual report to stockholders) are eliminated, only five directors
failed to be re-elected and not more than two directors in any company. A random
two-year consecutive period between 1969 and 1975 was selected for each corporation as the basis for comparison.
16J. BACON, CoRPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES table 6 at 29 (1973). A distinct
majority of the companies surveyed in this study had boards consisting of a majority of outside (but presumably affiliated or friendly) directors, id., at 2.
I7See the 1975 Proxy Statement of American Telephone and Telegraph Co. for
the 1975 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
18See the 1975 Proxy Statements of Exxon Corp., United States Steel Corp. and
Caterpillar Tractor Co., respectively, for their 1975 annual meetings of shareholders.
19Berle and Means, note 4, supra, at 66.
20Six of the companies in the survey described in note 15, supra, had an adverse
financial report (compared to the prior year) for the fiscal year immediately preceeding the election; of these six companies only three of an aggregate of ninetysix directors failed of re-election, two of whom were directors in one corporation
with a twelve-man board.
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management proxy, although management may recognize a substantial
stock position with a place on the board. Shareholders may vote for
management's nominees listed on the proxy but cannot use that proxy
to vote for other candidates. 21 Except by assuming all the expenses
connected with a proxy fight, there is no practical way to solicit proxies
for a dissident slate or a minority director. The obstacle is not legal
(except in those states where a stockholder cannot get a shareholders
list sufficiently in advance of the meeting22), but one of cost. 2 3 At a
minimum there is the cost of preparing, filing and processing a proxy
statement through the Commission, printing and mailing the proxy
statement, as well as the associated legal expenses.24 To this should be
added soliciting expenses, possible newspaper advertisements, prepaid
return postage and the problem of securing a shareholders list (which
frequently requires litigation). Unless control of the board is secured,
even a successful candidate might have to repeat this procedure every
year. Opposition nominations can be made and votes can be cast in
person at the meeting for such non-management nominees but since
almost all votes are cast by proxy before the meeting and few, if any,
shareholders vote in person, it is an empty right. The right to solicit
proxies is the right to elect.
Unless there is an election contest, brokerage firms which own stock
in street name are permitted by the New York and American Stock
Exchange rules to cast proxies for the election of management's
nominees. 25 This enables management to readily secure a quorum. On
the other hand, if there is an opposing slate the brokerage house must
solicit instructions from the beneficial owners of securities (at the
company's or soliciting parties' expense, as the case may be). Brokerage
firms may not vote their own wishes except for securities of which they
are beneficial as well as record owners.26 The information furnished
to shareholders in the proxy statement generally consists of a nominee's
21An examination of the form of proxy of several hundred companies indicates
this to be the universal practice. The management proxy form for the 1975 annual
meeting of the shareholders of the Proctor and Gamble Co., in what may be a
singular example, allows shareholders to vote for some nominees and withhold
their votes from others.
22The shareholders list is useful for personal solicitation but may not be essential
if time is not of the essence and the insurgents can contest the election exclusively
by mail and advertisements. See SEC Proxy Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1956).
23See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1489, 15~01 (1970).
24Compliance with SEC Rule 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968) is required.
25Rules 450-60 of the Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 2 CCH NEw
YoRK SrocK EXCHANGE GuiDE §§ 2450-60 and Rules 575-85 of the Rules of the
American Stock Exchange, 2 CCH AMERICAN SrocK ExcHANGE GUIDE§§ 9526-37.
These rules apply to securities held by men1ber firms of the exchanges regardless
of whether a stock is listed on the exchange.
26Jd.
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principal occupation (and if he is being elected by shareholders for
the first time, his principal occupation for the past five years), his
ownership of equity securities of the company and of securities of any
class of which he and his associates own ten percent, the compensation
of any directors or nominees who received more than $40,000 a year,
and certain transactions between the company and its directors or
nominees since the beginning of the company's last full fiscal year. 2 7
There is no statement reflecting a nominee's position on any matters
concerning the company, from dividend policy to plant expansion, from
ecology to diversification to doing business with Russia. Finally, it is
the company, not the nominee, which pays the cost of management
solicitation.
There can be, and in rare instances still are, proxy fights. When one
group of investors decides that it would like to replace the management with its own nominees and has accumulated enough shares to
make an effective challenge, it must, if it wishes to solicit proxies, file
its own proxy statement with the Commission28 and solicit proxies
from the shareholders at its own expense. If the challengers win they
can sometimes be reimbursed by the company. 29 Win or lose, the
company will normally bear management's costs.30 Usually, it is a
"winner takes all" contest; i.e., one entire slate or another is elected.
Occasionally a single seat on a board of a corporation with cumulative
voting will be contested. These fights can be prohibitively expensive
and are not undertaken except in unusual circumstances. The larger the
company, the less the likelihood there is of a proxy fight. 3 1 As a result,
tender offers appear to have become the preferred "take over" technique.32
An examination of files of the New York Stock Exchange disclosed
that during the twenty-one month period beginning January 1, 1972
and ending September 30, 1973, there were only five companies which
had proxy fights for the election of directors among the approximately
1,500 companies listed on the Exchange. 33 One of these corporations
(with cumulative voting) had two contests in this period by the same
27SEC Proxy Rule 14a-101, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (schedule A) (1974).
28SEC Proxy Rule 14a-ll, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968).
29Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291 (1955); L. Loss, SECURITIIts REGULATION 857 (2d ed. 1961).
30[d.

31Fleisher & Mundheim,Corporate Acquisition By Tender Offer, in SELECTED
ARTICLES ON FED:eRAL SECURITIIts LAw 815, 818-19 (H. Wander & W. Grienenberger eds. 1968). Some examples of the costs of proxy fights are set forth in
the footnotes to Eisenberg, note 23, supra.
32Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 767 (1971).
33This period included two annual meetings of shareholders for the election of
directors for most of the companies surveyed.
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insurgent for one seat on the board, but not for control. In a country
where a local schoolboard cannot be elected without a contest, these
statistics clearly suggest that corporate democracy is moribund if not
extinct.
The situation in most corporations may be analogized to a one-party
government whose citizens may vote for management, or not vote at
all. The corporations are often controlled by men who are more concerned with their jobs and the company qua company than with a powerless electorate. The "government" may no longer even feel compelled to
maximize earnings, but only to avoid loss and its destructive effect on
the technostructure34 and their security.35
What is missing? The opportunity to dissent. The opportunity for
shareholders who are not part of management to be represented on the
board or at least a chance to appear on the ballot. A program to
establish meaningful shareholder democracy is outlined in part III of
this article. However, the scope of the problem is even broader because
an estimated twenty-eight percent of all stock shares are held by mutual
funds, banks, pension plans, universities, nominees and the like.36
These shares are routinely voted for management. The governing
philosophy appears to be that if one is unhappy with management, then
he should sell ; otherwise vote for the incumbents. 37 Of course, as has
been noted, this discussion is more often than not a theoretical one,
since alternative slates are rare. To have meaningful,· functioning
democratic capitalism, a way of giving impact to the indirect votes of
the beneficial owners of these interests must be found.
II.

NoN-TRADITIONAL ALTERNATIVES

It has been assumed thus far that corporate democracy is a necessary
economic manifestation of a political democracy-that capitalism in a
democracy should mean democratic capitalism or else political democracy itself will be endangered. There are nevertheless several possible
alternatives to traditional corporate democracy, not all of which are
democratic, not all of which are capitalistic.
Eliminate the Election of Directors
The first possibility would be to carry the present system to its
34See text at note 40, infra.
35Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 168-169.
36The stock referred to includes both common and preferred issues. Note 10,
supra, at 24.
37Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12, Z6 (1962); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management
in Modem Corporate Decision-making, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 49 (1969).
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logical conclusion and eliminate all annual meetings for the election of
directors. An annual report to shareholders and a statement in lieu
of a proxy statement would presumably still be required as it is now
for companies whose managements do not solicit proxies. 38 However,
shareholders would recognize that they were not corporate citizens of a
democracy so much as investors in an autocracy. 39 Some money might
even be saved. Shareholders owning at least ten percent of the outstanding voting stock could be allowed to demand that an annual
meeting for the election of directors be held to allow for the violent
eruption of a proxy fight. Such suggestions lead in turn to managerialism. Or to put it another way, managerialism now exists in fact if
not in form and the election of directors has been all but eliminated in
fact if not in form.
M anagerialism40

In a large and complex corporation, not only are the stockholders
without power but as Professor Galbraith has observed, " ... the Board
of Directors is normally the passive instrument of the management."4 1
The entrepreneur has been replaced by management42-by the somewhat larger number of individuals who bring specialized knowledge,
talent or experience to group decision making and who compose what
Galbraith calls the technostructure. Moreover, "Given the deep
dependence of the industrial system on the state and the nature of its
motivational relationship to the state, i.e., its identification with public
goals and the adaptation of these to its needs, the industrial system
will not long be regarded as something apart from government. Rather
it will be seen as part of a much larger complex which embraces both
the individual system and the state," 43 one which is leading to the
socialization of the mature corporation.44 It is "socialism" with two
major distinctions. First, the allocation of capital, the investment risk
of the venture and a return on the investment are basically (though not
entirely) private rather than public; and secondly, the board of directors
38SEC Proxy Rule 14c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974).
YALE L. ]. 1477, 1485-88 (1958).
40A summary of the general theories which might be classified as managerialism
is contained in Eisenberg, note 37, supra, at 20. This approach has been refined
and modified by Professor Galbraith and this discussion is based on his analysis,
Galbraith, note 6, supra.
41Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 149.
42/d., at 70.
43/d., at 395.
44/d., at 397.
39Cf, Manning, Book Review, 67
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(and through them the technostructure) has no responsibility to a body
politic, be it shareholders or the government. 45
It would appear that the model of the technostructure is a good
descriptive model of corporate power and decision making in a contemporary corporation. There is little doubt as to the ability of the
industrial system to serve man's physical needs, but as Galbraith asks,
is it consistent with his liberty ?46 Not, he replies, if we continue to
believe that "the goals of the industrial system . . . are coordinate with
life," but only if aesthetic goals are strongly asserted.47 And this would
hopefully be accomplished because the demands of the industrial system
in. contrast ~ith its economic antecedents are intellectually' demanding
and will bring forth a technostructure which will reject the goals of the
industrial system which has bred it. 48 This is indeed a slender reed
upon which to trust our freedom. That may be why, despite Plato,
there are still poets in our Republic. A large public corporation or an
industrial state is not an economic entity alone and the inherent political
needs of freedom cannot be guarded solely by economic arrangements
or wistful entreaties to the future character of man. Liberty and freedom
are political rights and can best be enhanced as they have always been,
by reliance on democratic political processes, if appropriate ones can be
found. Only if that search fails should efforts be bent in another
direction.
Client-Group Participation

Another suggestion which has been put forth is to allow client-groups
of the corporation to participate in decision making. These would include employees, customers including consumers, and suppliers and
distributors at the expense of or even to the exclusion of the shareholders.49 Except in the case of employees, this would probably raise
an insuperable task of selecting representatives as well as countless
instances of conflict of interest. How would directors be allocated among
the several groups, who would have a right to vote, and how many votes
might they cast? In any event, if this is the desired result might it not be
45Galbraith finds economic power under democratic socialism in the non-communist world to also be lodged with the technostructure and removed from the
reach of social (political) control but that public ownership may increase the amenability of the public corporation to social goals. Id., at 98, 104. It is unclear
whether political control of enterprises has disintegrated as far in the Soviet Union.
Id., at 106-07. Certainly in theory it has not done so. E. LIBERMAN, EcoNOMIC
METHODS AND THIS EFFECT!VtNESS OF PRODUC'l'ION 44 (1970).
46Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 399.
47Jd., at 401-2.
48Jd.

49Eisenberg, note 37, supra, at 16.
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better achieved by an ombudsman or direct state ownership?
Employee representation is at least mechanically feasible since there
is a well-defined group, usually with a union, and established voting
procedures under the supervision of the National Labor Relations
Board. This attempt at codetermination with employees has apparently
worked reasonably well in Germany but may be peculiar to the continental climate.so Codeterminism is inconsistent with the American
tradition of labor management relations and American commentators
have been suspicious about its applicability or acceptability on these
shores.s1
Even if one accepts the principle of codeterminism there remains
the question of how to select the shareholders' representatives to the
board, so at best and a doubtful best at that, codeterminism will complicate the problem of democracy, but will not solve it. 52
Ombudsman

Would the creation of an ombudsman at the state or federal level
promote corporate democracy? It is certainly an alternative to clientgroup participation and the government might appoint separate ombudsmen as watchdogs for labor's rights, consumers' rights, etc. An
ombudsman might attend and speak out, but not vote at directors'
meetings. Many of these functions are now more or less allocated to
the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, etc. The concept of
giving the public at large or interest groups a voice in the direction
of the corporation, considering the corporate influence on society, may
have considerable merit. However, an ombudsman might appear to be
more of a spy than a spokesman and there are already an abundance of
regulatory agencies.
Presidential Directors

A more useful approach than an ombudsman and a variation of clientgroup participation might be to authorize the President of the United
States to appoint an ex officio member of the board at large for each
public interest. This will not solve the problem of democratically electing directors but in its absence would give some political base to the
board. However, the establishment of a representative corporate govsosee Vagts, Reforming the Modem Corporatim~: Perspectives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966-67) for an extended treatment of the German
experience with codeterminism.
Slid.; Eisenberg, note 37, supra, at 20-21.
52Cf. Vagts, note 50, supra., at 87-89.
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ernment might by itself furnish a sufficient political body to obviate the
need for this indirect representation of the public. It would be a supplemental not a basic reform. However, if electoral reforms are not
instituted, such an appointee system might prove a worthy experiment
before the ultimate political alternative of socialism.

The Government as the Sole Stockholder
The Government is already an equal economic partner with the
shareholders through taking fifty percent of the profits by way of taxes.
The Government is often a direct or indirect source of business,53 and
by means of the investment credit, tax depreciation and depletion allowance, an indirect source of equity capital. The Government also greatly
influences the cost and availability of credit. Then, of course, there is .
the whole panoply of governmental standards and regulatory agencies,
and in the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Government has completed
the circle and is the sole owner. On the other hand, the communist
countries of the Soviet bloc have been adopting capitalistic management
techniques to the ordering of the productive and distributive aspects of
their economy by decentralization, reliance on the market and the use
of profit-based incentive systems. 54 Coming to a first flowering in
Hungary, this approach has been expounded in the Soviet Union since
the early 1960's by E. G. Liberman and others who have expostulated
the essential role of commodity-monetary relations in the system of
planned economic management, 5S and who have reached the further
conclusion that the form of profit under socialism is similar to profit
under capitalism.5 6 The tools of financial planning of both the Soviet
centrally planned system and the divisional systems of large American
corporations have become similar. 57 In fact it has been suggested that
Soviet enterprises should pay into the state budget out of their profits
a certain percentage of the value of their assets as a payment for use of
plant, i.e., a return on capital.58 However, under capitalism, Liberman
asserts, profit is the goal of private enterprise while the goal in the
Soviet Union is the satisfaction of the social and personal needs of the
people. 59 The Soviet enterprise is in fact run by a technocracy not
unlike the technostructure of American corporations except that instead
of being theoretically responsible to its shareholders it is in fact polit53Sce Berte and Means, note 4, supra, at xvi; Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 395.
(M. Sharpe ed. 1966).
SSLiberman, note 45, supra.
S6Jd., at 57.

54Tat LIBERMAN DiscussiON

S7B. HoRWITZ, AccouNTING CoNTROLS AND THE SoviET EcoNOMIC REFORMS OF

1966 (1970).
S8[d., at 23-36. See Liberman, note 45, s11pra, at 57.
59Liberman, id.
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ically responsible to the state through the Gosplan (State Planning
Committee). 60
Is there then a convergence or at least a converging of the economic
systems of European Communism and American capitalism? With
some reservations and still marked differences, the answer would appear
to be in the affirmative, or at least that there is a serious mutual
flirtation.61 Yet, even a casual observer of the social and political
systems of the Soviet Union and the United States could not help but
be struck by the marked and continuing differences.
These are, then, clearly political not economic questions62 and there
must be political solutions consistent with American democratic traditions. While totalitarian socialism would not be tolerable in this country,
nations such as Great Britain and Sweden with traditions of democracy
and freedom have opted for an increasing element of "democratic"
socialism. But because of the size and· complexities of its economy, the
Soviet Union may be the only comparable model. There is, then, the
danger that if the economic circle is completed, the political circle may
be completed. There is an equal danger that a powerful social and
economic force in the country which has no political obligation may
also lead to totalitarianism.

III. A PROPOSAL TO FuRTHER CoRPORATE DEMOCRACY
The search for or apology for non-democratic solutions for corporate
democracy has been conducted perhaps not so much from a lack of faith
in democracy as from despair as to how it might practically be achieved.
The proposals set forth below apply a number of democratic institutional
models to the corporate setting to further a concept of corporate
democracy and furnish a political foundation for public corporations.
Shareholders' Candidates
The cornerstone of corporate democracy must be to allow shareholders (as well as management) a reasonable opportunity to elect
directors in faet as well as in theory. This includes the right to nominate a director to appear on the ballot, and th~ right to vote and have
60Horwitz, note 57, StiJira, at 3-9; N. LUBINTSEV, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND ExPERIENC¢ OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION 12-18

(1965).

'

61Liberman, Are We Flirting with Capitalism? in Sharpe, note 54, supra, at 304;
Linnemann, Pronk & Tinbergen, Convergence of Economic Systems in East a11d
West, in THE SoviET EcoNOMY 441 (3d ed., M. Bornstein & D. Fusfeld eds.);
Wiles, Convergence: Possibility and Probability, in A. BALINSKI, A. BERGSON, J.
HAZARD & P. WILES, PLANNING AND THE MARKET IN THE U.S.S.R.: THE 1960's

(1970).
62As Dr. Gardiner Means has observed, "[T]he real difference between the system operating in Russia today and that in the United States is concerned with
power and who makes what decisions." Berle & Means, note 4, supra, at xxxvii.
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others vote for such nominee by proxy without undue effort or cost.
Since management controls elections by control of the proxy machinery,
this machinery must be opened equally to all shareholders. There must
be the opportunity to nominate candidates to appear along with management's nominees in the company's proxy statement and on a single
company ballot; furthermore, companies should be required to solicit
proxies.
There are undoubtedly many constructs which can be created to
accomplish this objective. For purposes of this paper only a procedure
suggested by the present provisions in the proxy rules for submitting
proposals to meetings of security holders will be discussed. 63 Under this
method a nomination could be made by any shareholder by sending the
name of his nominee, together with the candidate's consent to serve and
the necessary background information required by the proxy rules, 64
to the secretary of the corporation a reasonable time before the election
is to be held.65 The candidate would have to be responsible for complying with such rules and for the accuracy of the information furnished.
If the company had any reservations about such accuracy or compliance
its obligation would be limited to so advising the Commission. For
practical purposes the number of such non-management nominees should
be limited to certainly no more than the number of vacancies on the
board and perhaps less. There is the danger that too many nominees
might dilute the votes of insurgents thus dooming any attempt to have
non-management representation on the board. Hence, a smaller number
of nominees might be preferable. In fact, this proposal might find
quicker acceptance in the business community if shareholder nominees
were limited to one less than a majority of the board, thus not
threatening incumbent management with a change in control. This
requirement, as with most of the details of these procedures, should
be within the rule-making authority of the Commission so that they
can be modified with experience. If there are more nominees than
places, those nominees having the greatest number of shares supporting
their nomination petitions would be selected to appear in the proxy
statement. A candidate would not be permitted to run for more than
two consecutive years unless he received ten percent of the votes
necessary to elect one director at the most recent meeting.66. A can63SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1972). Section 14a-8(a) of this rule
now specifically excludes any application to corporate elections.
64See items 6 and 7 of schedule 14a, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974).
65The nominating shareholder would presumably have to be a shareholder on the
date of the nomination and the record date for the meeting. This procedure is
consistent with state law (although the proposals may supercede certain by-laws).
See Eisenberg, note 23, supra, at 1502.
66See the section entitled Cumulative Voting, infra, at 54.
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didate should be allowed to count the votes he received in the last
election towards his qualification as a nominee. Rules governing the
soliciting of support for nominating petitions might be required.
The proxy statement should allow each of the nominees named in
the proxy statement (management nominees and shareholders' nominees) to furnish a short (one hundred word) summary indicating
among other things whether or not he agrees with management policies.
Shareholders will then have something more than a director's principal
occupation and share ownership on which to base a decision. Nominees,
of course, would have to disclose if they have any direct or indirect
affiliation with any competitor, supplier or customer, and nominees
whose election to the board might be illegal because of the antitrust
laws or otherwise could be omitted from the proxy statement, again
under appropriate Commission rules or guidelines. The names of all
nominees listed in the proxy statement should be included in the management proxy which would then be a company proxy. If there were
more nominees than vacancies on the board, shareholders would vote
for each of the directors they support. The proxy committee would be
bound to vote in accordance with the proxy instructions in the same
way proxies under the current rules follow such instructions in casting
negative votes against a management-supported merger. 67 "Bullet" or
slate voting would not be allowed as it would only encourage the oneparty system these proposals are designed to eliminate, and candidates'
names should be listed in alphabetical order. Shares held in street name
by brokerage houses would, as now, be voted on instructions from their
beneficial owners when there is a contest. 68 Companies listed on the
major stock exchanges are required to solicit proxies for shareholder's
meetings69 and even unlisted corporations which choose not to solicit
proxies must furnish information to their shareholders comparable to
that which would be included in a proxy statement. 70 The cost of these
proposals to the corporation and the effort necessary to implement them
would be minimal, totaling little more than a small increase in printing
charges from the addition of proxy material prepared by the candidates.
The concept of shareholders' candidates will certainly be resisted by
many who enjoy the status quo. Their position will likely focus on the
argument that a board of directors should represent all the company's
shareholders as a group, and the supposition that a minority director
67SEC Proxy Rule 14a-4(b) (1), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968).
68Note 25, supra.
69Listing Agreements of the New York Stock Exchange § III 11 5, NEw YoRK
STOCK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL B-95, B-101 and American Stock Exchange
§ 6b, AMERICAN SrocK ExcHANGE CoMPANY GuiDE 299, 300 (1973).
70SEC Proxy Rule 14c-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1969).
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will introduce dissent into an otherwise harmonious board. 71 Many
boards go through a full year of meetings without a single dissenting
• ote. An abstention (except because of a conflict of interest) is often
c:Dnsidered to be the harshest of criticisms. 72 If this situation could be
. . Ganged, boards with minority directors might cease being "the passive
•. tstrument of management."7 3 A minority director owes the same
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders as do all other
,•.irectors. He will at least have a true constituency among the share;,olders and his interest in their welfare will be inherently no less than
....n inside director with job and compensation conflicts. But efficiency
is always the oligarch's argument against democracy. The resolution
must be based on political philosophy not economic pragmatism.
The authority granted to the Commission by sections 14(a) and
23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193474 appears sufficiently
broad to permit the Commission to adopt implementing regulations.
Over the years the contents of proxy statements and annual reports
have had their scope expanded and companies' obligations under the
rules enlarged so that management is now required to mail proxy
statements and other communications for security holders,7 5 shareholders
are allowed to submit proposals which must be included in the management proxy statement,7 6 and an increasing quantity of public financial
information is being made available to stockholders, particularly in the
annual report to shareholders. 77 As late as 1966 shareholders who
wished to vote at an annual meeting on any matter presented to shareholders (other than the election of directors), for all practical purposes,
also had to vote for management's nominees for directors. Today a
stockholder may vote for a merger and abstain from voting for management's nominees.7 8 It would appear that the proposals put forth
here could be adopted by the Commission within the authority granted
to it to make rules with regard to the solicitation of proxies.79
71Cf. Bacon, note 16, supra, at 9.
72See Mace, note 14, supra, at 46-7, 54-5. This is true although many companies
have boards with a majority of outside directors, see Bacon, id., at 2. However,
their constituency is too often the board which selects them rather than the shareholders who nominally elect them.
73Galbraith, note 6, supra, at 149.
7415 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
7SSEC Proxy Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1956).
76SEC Proxy Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1972).
77SEC Proxy Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974).
7SSEC Proxy Rule 14a-4(b) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1968).
79Note 63, supra. The last sentence of Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1972)
would have to be correspondingly deleted and its inclusion in the rule would appear
to be an acknowledgement by the Commission that this area is within its rulemaking competence.
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Cumulative Voting
However, changes in the election procedure are only the beginning.
For it must be assumed that management with the cooperation of
institutional investors, will as it always has, still normally control a
majority of the votes cast. An occasional minority director might be
elected, but it would be the exception. Fifty-one perc~nt of a quorum
at a stockholders' meeting would still typically elect one hundred percent
of the board. Something more is needed. The traditional manner of
assuring broad representation in the election of directors is by compulsory cumulative voting. It has been relatively successful in private
corporations but has not led to significant minority representation in
public companies80 because alternative candidates are not listed in
the proxy statement or on the proxy card. The proposed amendments
to the proxy rules in the preceeding section would remedy that defect.
The effectiveness of cumulative voting is further diminished by the
practice of classifying directors.s 1 A nine-man board might be divided
into three classes of three directors each, elected for three-year terms.
A minority will thus require many more votes to elect a director than
if all nine seats were being filled at the same time, 82 thereby defeating
the effect of cumulative voting. Twenty-one states have mandatory
cumulative voting provisions. 83 However, it is unlikely such provisions
will )le generally adopted by the remaining states because of the
competition among most states to enact liberal corporate codes in
order to attract large companies as domestic corporations. 84 Since
Congress has moved to regulate corporate elections through the 1934
Act, this proposal is a natural and necessary outgrowth of that legislative scheme. Although cumulative voting has been governed by state
law, it is a provision that concerns the state of incorporation little, if at
80Bacon, note 16, supra, at 8.
81See Wolfson v. Avery, 6 111.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955), which held a statute
allowing classification of directors inconsistent with a State constitutional requirement of cumulative voting; contra, Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa.
282, 128 A.Zd 76 (1956).
82For example, if a corporation had cumulative voting, a board of nine directors,
and 1,000,000 shares of voting stock represented at an annual meeting, then
100,000 shares would be ·required to elect one director; if the board were divided
into three classes of three directors each, then 250,000 shares would be required
to elect one director. The New York Stock Exchange refuses to authorize the
listing of stock where the board is divided into more than three classes. Nr."W YoRK
STOCK ExcHANGE CoMPANY MANUAL § A15, at A-280.
83As of 1972, seventeen states had mandatory provisions on cumulative voting,
and four states had mandatory cumulative voting on request. Twenty-six states
had permissive provisions and three states had no provision on cumulative voting.
Bacon, note 16, supra, at 8.
84Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections uPon Delaware, 83 YALE
L. ]. 663 (1974).
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all, with respect to a public corporation. Corporate elections in public
companies are, as Congress has already determined,ss of national concern. Such elections affect the interstate commerce of this country in
many ways, not to mention the nation's basic political democracy.s6
In addition to the proxy regulations, the federal government has
already intruded directly into the state voting requirement in several
other areas. For example, section 424c of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 makes shareholder approval a condition of a qualified stock
option plan although not required by state law, and the Investment
Company Act of 194087 directs that at any time less than a majority
of directors of a registered investment company are elected by
shareholders, a shareholder's meeting must promptly be held to
fill vacancies on the board. A federal law of corporations is not
being proposed,ss but the time has come for Congress to put a roof
on the edifice it has long since erected.

Institutional Stockholders
Finally, we come to what has been perhaps the most cumbersome
stumbling block to effective corporate democracy-the concentration of
large blocks of funds in the hands of trusts, union pension funds,
mutual funds and the like, which for the balance of this article shall be
called institutions. However, two complementary suggestions, a passthrough vote and a Committee on Shareholder Responsibility, present
reasonable and practical solutions.
Institutions whose portfolios are composed of relatively few stocks
(five or less) could pass through the vote in these companies to their
shareholders or other beneficial owners, comparable to the manner in
which brokerage houses request instructions from beneficial owners on
how to vote stock held in street name when there is a proxy fight.S9
This approach might also be followed for any security in a portfolio
which constitutes more than ten percent of the outstanding stock of
SSNote 7, s-upra; and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1970).
86A survey of 855 public corporations by The Conference Board, reported in 1973,
showed that 273 companies ( 32%) had specifically provided for cumulative voting
in their by-laws or certificates of incorporation or both. Almost two-thirds had
done so in response to a legal requirement, but the remainder instituted the provision as a matter of choice. Bacon, note 16, supra, at 7.
87Jnvestment Company Act of 1940 § 16a, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16a (1940) ..
88But see Schwartz, The Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 8 Bus.
~£ Soc. Rtv. 53 (1973-74).
89Note 25, mpra. The New York Stock Exchange has for some time had an
.nformal policy of requiring a company pension trust which has significant holdings
of its own company's stock to solicit voting instructions from the beneficiaries of
the trust. Cf. Restrictions on Voting Rights Through Voting Trusts or Similar
Arrangements, NEw YoRK STOCK ExcBANG~ CoMPANY MANUAL§ AlS, at A-280.
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any class of securities entitled to elect a director regardless of the
number of different securities in its portfolio. Copies of the proxy
material would be mailed to the stockholders or beneficial owners of
the securities at the cost of the soliciting corporation.90 Voting would
not be on an all or none basis but would be in a pro rata manner to
reflect the instructions of the institutions' shareholders or other beneficial owners based on their proportionate beneficial interest in the
portfolio. These rules should not apply to investments in subsidiaries,
but to investments by subsidiaries in outside corporations and should
be consolidated with such investments by the parent corporation for
these purposes. Investments of industrial companies or utilities as part
of their normal business activities or investments of any institution in
non-public companies should be exempt from such requirements. However, this procedure will become too cumbersome for institutions with a
large portfolio of stocks, each representing a relatively small voting
position.
The second suggestion, applicable to all other situations, is the
selection for each institution of a Committee on Shareholder Responsibility which would have the authority to vote the stock held by the
institution.91 The Committee would be charged with the duty of making
a specific determination on how to vote the stock held by the institution
in any contested election, and the institution would cast its vote in
proportion to the vote of its Committee members.
Since most institutions vote unfailingly for the management slate,
evidencing disapproval by selling the security of the portfolio company
rather than by attempting to sponsor or participate in movements for
management reorganization,92 the separation of the voting decision from
the investment decision is justified in practice, and moreover would be
a decision and not merely a clerical act. 93 The boards of directors
90Cf, note 12, supra.
91An interesting example of a comparable but more restricted committee in a
noncommercial situation is the Advisory Committe on Shareholders Responsibility
at Harvard University which studies proposals which will come before shareholders' meetings of corporations in which Harvard owns stock and makes voting
recommendations to the governing body of the university.
92Wharton Study, note 37, supra.
93Investors apparently are generally concerned with the social as well as economic impact of the investments made by institutions in which they have an interest.
A survey was conducted in 1971 by the Wellington Management Co. which
then managed four mutual funds with assets of $3.5 billion. The survey showed
that 82% of the stockholders agreed a fund should emphasize investments in socially
responsible companies since such qualities tended to be indicative of management
ability and responsiveness to changing trends in other areas, and 56% agreed that a
fund should invest only in socially responsible companies even if other companies
offered better investment opportunities. As noted in editorial comment following
Doctors, Who Uses Social Criteria in Institutional Investing, 2 Bus. & Soc. REV.
98 (1972).
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historically have not actively made such choices, nor are they necessarily
inclined to devote the required energy to what would become a time
consuming task. They are interested in running their institutions, not
making decisions on the management of other companies.
There are several alternatives for selecting the Committee, including
the election of the Committee by the shareholders at the annual shareholder's meeting, selection of the Committee by the board, or by the
outside directors on the board. A combination of these suggestions·
might best achieve a broad representation with a maximum of expedience. The Committee could be composed of the outside (non-management) directors plus any nominee for director who received at
least ten percent of the votes necessary to elect him as a director (under
cumulative voting) at the last annual meeting, but in no event should
the Committee be larger than the board. The Committee should also be
authorized to select an Advisory Group which could make recommendations to the Committee. The members of the Advisory Group would
not be employees of the institution and provisions would have to be
incorporated in any legislation to assure that the Advisory Group would
be independent, although they might be compensated. While admittedly
the Committee vote is not a direct vote by the shareholders, it is likely
to be reasonably reflective of their views. Concededly, this is not a
perfect system, but it will compel a political and economic input by
institutions, and the institutional vote will not necessarily be an automatic vote for management. 94
The implementation of these proposals would require amendments
to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Since the implementation of these proposals will be a new
corporate experience, legislation should be broadly drafted, giving extensive regulatory authority to the Commission.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

The present industrial and financial complex in America is composed
principally of public corporations whose management is responsive in
the normal course to itself alone, a situation perpetuated by the current
complexion of federal and state law. The states have avoided the problem
or left it to a Congress which since the 1934 Act has relied on the proxy
rules alone to foster democracy in corporations. That solution was a
vital first step. Forty years later it is clear that it is not enough.
94A much less satisfactory but possible alternative would be to disenfranchise
shares while held by institutions.
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Despite the possible alternatives to democratic capitalism, it is submitted that the only realistic alternative to corporate democracy is
socialism, possibly democratic, not impossibly a form of national socialism. As the economic operation of capitalism and communism converge,
it becomes apparent that in the long view the principal difference between these systems may not be which can best deliver goods and
services to the people but which system is most consistent with liberty.
And liberty will only persist where the political system and the economic
system which support it are both rooted in democratic principles.

